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Abstract. Some recent incidents have shown that possibly the vulnerability of IT sys-
tems in railway automation has been underestimated. Fortunately, so far, almost only
denial-of-service attacks were successful, but due to several trends, such as the use of
commercial IT and communication systems or privatization, the threat potential could
increase in the near future. However, up to now, no harmonized IT security risk as-
sessment framework for railway automation exists. This paper defines an IT security
risk assessment framework which aims to separate IT security and safety requirements
as well as certification processes as far as possible. It builds on the well-known safety
and approval processes from IEC 62425 and integrates IT security requirements based
on the ISA99/IEC62443 standard series. While the detailed results are related to rail-
way automation the general concepts are also applicable to other safety-critical appli-
cation areas.
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1 Introduction
Over the last years, reports on IT security incidents related to railways have increased as
well as public awareness. For example, it was reported that, on December 1, 2011, “hack-
ers, possibly from abroad, executed an attack on a Northwest rail company's computers that
disrupted railway signals for two days” [1]. Although the details of the attack and also its
consequences remain unclear, this episode clearly shows the threats to which railways are
exposed when they rely on modern commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) communication and
computing technology. However, in most cases, the attacks are denial-of-service attacks
leading to service interruptions, but so far not to safety-critical incidents. But also other
services, such as satellite positioning systems, have been shown to be susceptible to IT
security attacks, leading to a recommendation that GNSS services should not be used as
standalone positioning services for safety-related applications [2].
What distinguishes railway systems from many other systems is their inherently distrib-
uted and networked nature with tens of thousands of kilometer track length for large opera-
tors. Thus, it is not economical to provide complete protection against physical access to
this infrastructure and, as a consequence, railways are very vulnerable to physical denial-of-
service attacks leading to service interruptions.
Another feature of railways distinguishing them from most other systems is the long
lifespan of their systems and components. Current contracts usually demand support for
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over 25 years and history has shown that many systems, e.g. mechanical or relay
interlockings, last much longer. IT security analyses have to take into account such a long
lifespan. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that at least some of the technical problems
are not railway-specific, but are shared by other sectors such as Air Traffic Management
[3].
Concerning IT security another difference to many other application sectors is that rail-
way automation is a highly safety-critical field, which has a rather strict approval regime
similar to civil aviation. It seems that so far many IT security considerations have been
made without this background. While in railway automation harmonized safety standards
were elaborated almost two decades ago, up to now no harmonized IT security require-
ments for railway automation exist.
This paper starts with a discussion of the normative and legal background. A short over-
view of the basic concepts of ISA99/IEC62443 [4] is given. Then several approaches to-
wards IT security risk assessment are discussed with particular focus on their applicability
to safety-critical systems. Then an IT security risk assessment framework is defined which
aims to separate IT security and safety requirements as well as certification processes as far
as possible. It is finally discussed how these concepts can be applied effectively to railway
automation as well as other safety-critical domains.
2 Normative Background
In railway automation, there exists an established standard for safety-related communica-
tion, IEC 62280 [5]. The first version of the standard was elaborated in 2001. It has proven
quite successful and is also used in other application areas, e.g. industry automation. This
standard defines threats and countermeasures to ensure safe communication in railway sys-
tems. So, at an early stage, the standard established methods to build a safe channel (in
security, called “tunnel” or “conduit”) through an unsafe environment. However, the threats
considered in IEC 62280 arise from technical sources or the environment rather than from
humans. The methods described in the standard are partially able to protect the railway
system also from intentional attacks, but not completely. Until now, additional organiza-
tional and technical measures have been implemented in railway systems, such as separated
networks, etc., to achieve a sufficient level of protection.
The safety aspects of electronic hardware and systems are covered by IEC 62425 [6].
However, security issues are taken into account by IEC 62425 only as far as they affect
safety issues, but, for example, denial-of-service attacks often do not fall into this category.
Questions such as intrusion protection are only covered by one requirement in Table E.10
(unauthorized access). Nevertheless, IEC 62425 provides a structure for a safety case which
explicitly includes a subsection on protection against unauthorized access (both physical
and informational).
On the other hand, industrial standards on information security exist. Here, we can iden-
tify the following standards:
· ISO/IEC 15408 [7] provides evaluation criteria for IT security, the so-called
Common Criteria [8,9,10]. This standard is solely centered on information systems
and has, of course, no direct relation to safety systems.
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· The ISA99/IEC62443 series is a set of standards currently elaborated by the Indus-
trial Automation and Control System Security Committee of the International So-
ciety for Automation (ISA). This standard is not railway-specific and focuses on
industrial control systems. It is dedicated to different hierarchical levels, starting
from concepts and going down to components of control systems.
Railways are certainly critical national and international infrastructures, so recently na-
tional governments, e.g. the USA and Germany, as well as the EU have identified the prob-
lem. They have defined clear policies to support the implementation of industry-defined
sector-specific IT security standards.
How can the gap between information security standards for general systems and rail-
ways be bridged? One bridge is provided by the European Commission Regulation No.
402/2013 on Common Safety Methods [11]. This Commission Regulation mentions three
different methods to demonstrate that a railway system is sufficiently safe:
a) by following existing rules and standards (application of codes of practice),
b) by similarity analysis, i.e. showing that the given (railway) system is equiva-
lent to an existing and used one,
c) by explicit risk analysis, where risk is assessed explicitly and shown to be ac-
ceptable.
We assume that, from the process point of view, security can be treated just like safety,
meaning that threats would be treated as particular hazards. Using the approach under a),
Common Criteria  or ISA99/IEC62443 may be used in railway systems, but particular tai-
loring would have to be performed due to different safety requirements and application
conditions. By this approach, a code of practice that is approved in other areas of technolo-
gy  and  provides  a  sufficient  level  of  security  can  be  adapted  to  railways.  This  ensures  a
sufficient level of safety.
However, application of the general standards [4,7] requires tailoring them to the specific
needs of a railway system. This is necessary to cover the specific threats associated with
railway systems and possible accidents and to take into account specific other risk-reducing
measures already present in railway systems, such as the use of specifically trained person-
nel.
This finally leads to a kind of “IT security for safety approach”, where the IT security
objectives and processes are referenced by  the technical safety report from IEC 62425, see
Figure 1. Other security objectives can also be described in that structure, however the puz-
zle is not complete today and needs further railway-specific supporting standards and
guidelines.
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Figure 1: Embedding on IT security in the technical safety report from IEC 62425
3 Problems with Threat&Risk Analysis for Safety-related Systems
From the risk analysis point of view, many concepts from safety and IT security seem very
similar; only the wording seems different. What’s called a hazard in safety is called a threat
in IT security, but the risk analysis processes really look alike. Thus it would be a logic
conclusion to apply the same risk assessment techniques to IT security. This idea is even
more supported by fact that many measures of IT security are adapted for safety and resid-
ual failure probabilities are computed, e.g. for transmission errors in communication, see
e.g. IEC 62280. As a matter of fact this similarity is used in many security standards, ISO
27005 [12] being the most general, but instead of probability the term likelihood is intro-
duced. A commonly used IT security risk matrix is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 2: Risk matrix based on ISO 27005
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In ISO 27005 “likelihood is used instead of the term ‘probability’ for
risk estimation”. It is admitted that “its ease of understanding” is an advantage, but “the
dependence on subjective choice of scale” is a disadvantage.
NIST guidance [13] explains in more detail: “The likelihood of occurrence is a weighted
risk factor based on an analysis of the probability that a given threat is capable of exploiting
a given vulnerability (or set of vulnerabilities). The likelihood risk factor combines an esti-
mate of the likelihood that the threat event will be initiated with an estimate of the likeli-
hood of impact (i.e., the likelihood that the threat event results in adverse impacts). For
adversarial threats, an assessment of likelihood of occurrence is typically based on: (i) ad-
versary intent; (ii) adversary capability; and (iii) adversary targeting.”
Aven [14] gives a broad discussion how all the different concepts can be combined in a
risk analysis. However we have to distinguish here between general or business risks and
safety risks. In economic risk assessments the goal is to find the best solution with a high
probability under uncertainty. In safety risk assessments we have to take into account the
fact that lives and health of people are at stake and that finally the risk assessments have to
be accepted by a safety authority. In safety-critical systems this approach creates problems
as it is hard to deal with subjective probabilities in the approval process.
Also scientifically the probabilistic approach does not really apply to IT security, e. g.
we can’t rely on statistical data or experience as we often do in safety as the threat land-
scape and risk assessment may change immediately if a new vulnerability becomes known.
Also the attacks, at least not the targeted attacks, don’t occur randomly. So as a matter of
fact we have both systematic causes as the initiators of a security threat and we have vul-
nerabilities, flaws in the system or SW engineering, as contributing factors, which also have
a systematic nature.
4 Overview of ISA99/IEC62443 Standards
Currently, 10 parts are planned in this standard series covering different aspects for indus-
trial automation and control systems (IACS, the main stakeholders are addressed in brack-
ets):
General (all):
· 1-1 Terminology, concepts and models
· 1-2 Master glossary of terms and abbreviations
Policies and procedures (railway operators)
· 2-1 Establishing an industrial automation and control system security program
2-3 Patch management in the IACS environment
· 2-4 Security program equirements for IACS solution suppliers
System (system integrators)
· 3-1 Security technologies for IACS
· 3-2 Security levels for zones and conduits
· 3-3 System security requirements and security levels
Components (suppliers of IT security products)
· 4-1 Product development requirements
· 4-2 Technical security requirements for IACS products
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The documents are at different stages of development, some being already international
standards, while others are at the first drafting stage. This leads in particular to problems
when the documents build on each other, e.g. Part 3-3 [15] with detailed security require-
ments is published, but it builds on Part 3-2 which defines the security levels and is restart-
ed after a negative vote.
The fundamental concept of the standard is to define foundational requirements (FR) and
security levels (SL) which are a “measure of confidence that the IACS is free from vulnera-
bilities and functions in the intended manner”. There are seven groups of FR:
1. Identification and authentication control
2. Use control
3. System integrity
4. Data confidentiality
5. Restricted data flow
6. Timely response to events
7. Resource availability
Each FR group has up to 13 sub-requirement categories which are tailored according to
the SL.
5 Security Levels
The default SL assignment for each zone and conduit is based on the attacker capability
only:
SL1: casual or unintended
SL 2: simple means: low resources, generic skills and low motivation
SL 3: sophisticated means: moderate resources, IACS-specific skills and moderate
motivation
SL 4: sophisticated means: extended resources, IACS-specific skills and high mo-
tivation
The default assignment can be changed based on the results of a threat and risk analysis.
For each FR, a different SL may be assigned. There is a distinction between a target SL (as
derived by threat and risk analysis), a design SL (capability of the solution architecture) and
finally the achieved SL (as finally realized). If either the design SL or the achieved SL does
not match the target SL, then additional measures have to be implemented (e.g. physical or
organizational) as compensation.
Taking into account the fact that there may also be no IT security requirement (SL 0), an
SL assignment results in a seven-dimensional vector with 57=78.125 possible different
assignments. Based on the SL assignment, a standardized set of IT security requirements
can be found in Part 3-3, which is a great advantage of the approach.
Note that there is no simple match between SL and the Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) ap-
plied in safety standards. However, the definition of SL1 is very similar to requirements in
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the safety field as also safety-related systems have to address topics such as operator error,
foreseeable misuse or effects of random failure. So we can conclude that a safety-related
system (SIL>0) should also fulfill the technical requirements of IEC 62443-3-3  as the
threats which SL1 addresses are also safety hazards.
A concise comparison shows that there are some differences in detail. IEC 62443-3-3
contains 41 requirements for SL1, of which more than half are directly covered by safety
standards such as IEC 62425 or IEC 62280, and about a quarter are usually fulfilled in
railway safety systems representing good practice. However, another quarter of the re-
quirements are usually not directly addressed in IEC 62425 safety cases. The main reasons
are that these requirements do not fall under the “IT security for safety” category but ad-
dress availability requirements in order to prevent denial of service or traceability require-
ments.
The current proposal is to include all SL1 requirements from IEC 62443-3-3 in the sys-
tem requirements specification of any safety-related signaling system. In this way, no addi-
tional SL1 IT security certification would be necessary and it would be a contribution to the
defense-in-depth principle. Finally, these requirements should find their place in the IEC
62278 standards series.
For the sake of brevity, we are focusing on system aspects in this paper. The first step after
system definition would be to divide the system into zones and conduits according to the
following basic rules:
· The system definition must include all hardware and software objects.
· Each object is allocated to a zone or a conduit.
· Inside each zone, the same IT security requirements are applicable.
· There exists at least one conduit for communication with the environment.
The next step is the threat and risk analysis resulting in SL assignment to each zone and
conduit. Here, railway applications might need procedures different from industry automa-
tion as factories and plants are usually physically well protected and are not moving.
As soon as the SL is assigned, standardized requirements from IEC 62443-3-3 can be de-
rived. These requirements would be taken over to the railway automation domain without
any technical changes. They would define the interface to use pre-certified IT security
components for the railway automation domain.
Finally, correct implementation of the IT security countermeasures according to IEC
62443-3-3 must be evaluated similar to the validation of safety functions.
6 Approaches towards IT Security Risk Assessment
6.1 IEC 62443-3-2 proposal
Recently, a novel approach towards semi-quantitative IT security risk assessment has
been proposed in the draft IEC 62443-3-2 [16]. But it did not pass the voting and so the
work had to be restarted. However it is very interesting to study this approach and why it
failed.
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The new approach starts with a sample risk matrix as shown in figure 3. It looks like a
common approach to determine the risk R for a particular threat from the parameters likeli-
hood L and impact I by
Figure 3: Sample risk matrix
Then, 4 is stipulated as a tolerable risk (without any justification) and any identified risk
value R is then divided by 4, giving the so-called cyber security risk reduction factor
(CRRF)
and finally the target SL is derived by
Formula (3) simply states that a SL-T must not be larger than 4 and that it is more or less
given by the integer part of the CRRF with a small correction of ¼. In order to understand it
better,  let  us  look at  some interesting  examples.  For  R=16,  the  CRRF is  4,  which  by  (3)
leads to SL-T=3. For R=17, it would lead to SL-T=4. Interestingly, both risks belong to the
highest risk category in Table 1. Also, other border cases are interesting, e.g. risks labeled
6, 7 and 8 lead to SL-T=1, while 9 and 10 would result in SL-T=2. While all low-level risks
should normally be acceptable, risks with 1, 2, 3, and 4 lead to SL-T=0, while 5 leads to
SL-T=1.
As explained above, IEC 62443 derives fundamental requirements in seven different
groups for zones and conduits of a particular IT security architecture. So the result should
be a seven-dimensional SL-T vector instead of a scalar value given by (3). But the process
description does not give any hint of how to derive the SL-T vector of a zone or conduit
from the risk assessment of a threat-vulnerability combination. No explanation is given
about how the concept is broken down to the foundational requirements. It may formally be
ܴ = ܮ ∙ ܫ (1)
CRRF=ܴ4 (2)
SL-T=min ൜4, ඌCRRF- 14ඐൠ (3)
1
Remote
2
Unlikely
3
Possible
4
Likely
5
Certain
1
Trivial
1 2 3 4 5
2
Minor
2 4 6 8 10
3
Moderate
3 6 9 12 15
4
Major
4 8 12 16 20
5
Critical
5 10 15 20 25
Im
pa
ct
Likelihood
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argued that the authors assume that all components of the SL-T vector equal the scalar val-
ue derived by (3), but this would, in most cases, lead to very demanding requirements, e.g.
for most ICS applications confidentiality is less important than integrity or availability and
so the DC foundational requirement can be much weaker than that for SI or RA.
Also, at least for safety-related systems, SL-T=0 does not really make sense as protec-
tion against casual or coincidental violation should be provided in any case. It is hard to
imagine a system which should not be protected against such threats. For safety-related
systems, it is necessary to prevent human errors or foreseeable misuse in any case.
Additionally,  there  is  a  difference  in  the  definition  of  SL  between  the  proposal  in
IEC 62443-3-2 and the other parts of the standards. By applying formulae (2) and (3), the
SL-T is equivalent to a risk reduction, while in the other parts, e.g. 62443-3-3, the SL-T is
defined with respect to the attacker type against whom they are to offer protection. The
relationship between risk reduction and the type of attacker is not explained, so it is ques-
tionable whether the approach fits to other parts of the standard.
The input scales for parameters L and I are ordinal, so we know only the ordering of val-
ues 1<2<3<4<5, but have no knowledge about their further relations. For example, we do
not know if an impact of 3 is five times more severe than that of 2. We could also re-label
the categories to A; B, C, D, E [17].
To make this more tangible, in programming languages such as Pascal or C, such ordinal
types could be declared as
type
impact = (trivial, minor, moderate, major, critical);
likelihood = (remote, unlikely, possible, likely, cer-
tain);
Semantically, only certain operations such as predecessor, successor, ordinal number,
greater than, etc., are defined for ordinal data types, but certainly not multiplication or divi-
sion, which are simply undefined for ordinal data.
What is suggested by Table 1 is that the ordinal data such as “minor” is equated numeri-
cally with their order values in their type definition, e.g. Ord(minor) which  equals  2.
These order values are then treated as rational numbers and used without further explana-
tion.
To make this argument clearer, assume that we would have labeled Table 1 with letters
instead of numbers. What would ܤ ∙ ܥ mean? Or how would the cyber-security risk reduc-
tion factor	ܤ ∙ ܥ/4 be interpreted? And why should the values be multiplied and not be
added?
So we can conclude that the proposal failed due to several reasons, the most important
being its insufficient integration with the other parts of the standards and theoretical defi-
ciencies. It also seems a fallacy to quantify risk reduction factors for IT security like prac-
ticed in safety.
6.2 German DKE 0831-104 proposal.
In a recently published standard for railway automation [18] the approach seems to avoid
the uncertainty or infeasibility of credible likelihood estimation, but rather to focus on the
capability of the attacker as stipulated by the SL definition. The rationale behind this ap-
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proach is that the worst case would be a remote attack, which cannot be traced and which
has safety impact. This case would deserve the highest IT security requirements.
In a first step, it must be decided whether the zone or conduit is exposed to malicious at-
tacks at all.  If no malicious attacks have to be assumed, then SL 1 is assigned for all  FR.
Otherwise, the parameters already addressed by IEC 62443 would be assessed separately
for each zone and each conduit according to Table 1. This means a score is assigned to each
of the parameters resources, know-how and motivation of the attacker.
Score 2 3 4
Resources (RES) Low Medium Extended
Know-how (KNO) Common System-specific Extended
Motivation (MOT) Low Limited High
Table 1: Assessment of attacker capability
The following railway specific risk parameters should be considered in addition to
the parameters already dealt with in IEC 62443, also in comparison with NIST 800-
30:
• Attack location (from where can the attack be launched?)
• Traceability of the attack (in the sense of non-repudiation)
• Potential extent of damage (Safety-critical impact)
It is important that a realistic type of  attacker is evaluated, rather than an evaluation of
which resources, capabilities and motivation an attacker would need for a successful attack.
As it has also been demonstrated that in particular the motivation of an attacker and the
location of the attack and its traceability are dependent on one another, the evaluation of the
attacker's motivation does not need to take place directly, but is covered by the other pa-
rameters.
A combination rule is needed to be able to evaluate these two parameters inde-
pendently. This is specified in Table 2.
R2 R3 R4
K2 PSL 2 PSL 3 PSL 4
K3 PSL 3 PSL 3 PSL 4
K4 PSL 3 PSL 4 PSL 4
Table 2 – Preliminary SL assignment
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In particular, the following facts were taken into account:
• According to IEC 62443, an SL x is sufficient to successfully ward off an
attacker belonging to the combination Rx, Kx and Mx.
• An attacker who possesses higher resources than skills could acquire the
applicable skills by using his resources.
• The motivation of an attacker and the location of the attack and its trace-
ability are dependent on one another.
The provisional SL (PSL) listed in Table 6 corresponds to the SL in compliance
with EC 62443 without considering railway specific risk factors.
Generally,  several  attacker  types  have  to  be  considered.  In  this  case,   the
highest PSL of the different attacker types' shall be taken into account. The
railway specific parameters have a special importance compared with other ap-
plication domains and can therefore give rise to adapted SL requirements.
The PSL may then be altered based on railway-specific risk parameters, e.g.
· location of the asset and the attacker (ORT), e.g. does the attacker need access
to the site or can the attack be launched remotely, e.g. from home?
· traceability and non-repudiation of the attack (NAC), e.g. is it possible to trace
the attacker and to collect sufficient evidence to identify him?
· potential of the attack (POT), e.g. is there no or limited safety implication of the
attack?
All these additional variables are binary and are set to 1 if the question can be answered
by YES. The final SL is assignment is then by
SL=PSL - maximum{ORT, NAC, POT} (4)
meaning that the PSL can be reduced if there is at least one railway risk reduction
factor present, but not more.
It should be noted that, according to IEC 62443, the assessment would have to be carried
out for all  seven FR. However, from a railway safety point of view, some of the FR have
only little safety impact so that FR such as “Data confidentiality” or “Resource availability”
should always be assigned SL1 as a default. Also, it can be argued that there is no real rea-
son to  distinguish  between the  other  FR,  because  they  are  not  independent,  and it  is  pro-
posed to allocate the same SL to all five remaining FR. This would lead to only four classes
for railway signaling applications
· SL1 =(1,1,1,1,1,1,1)
· SL2 =(2,2,2,1,2,2,1)
· SL3 =(3,3,3,1,3,3,1)
· SL4 =(4,4,4,1,4,4,1)
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In the approach presented here, it has to be decided against which kind of attackers the
system has to be made secure, which is a decision to be taken by the railway operator and
the safety authority. This decision is guided by the parameters in Table 1. The SL then rep-
resents the effort which must be made so that the system effectively withstands attacks by
these kinds of attackers. Only attackers who exceed this effort considerably might be able
to overcome the IT security countermeasures. Different kinds of attackers on railway assets
have already been researched [19] and the results were compatible with the classification
proposed here.
However it may be criticized that this approach concentrates too much on the attacker
capability without exploiting all attack scenarios or taking all security aspects into account.
In order to satisfy these critics we extend the approach in the next chapter.
7 Combined approach
We can summarize the analysis so far that the approach proposed by IEC 62443-3-2 has
several systematic flaws which cannot be easily overcome. In particular, the question of
calculating IT security-related risks is very complex and should be avoided [20]. But we
have sketched an approach how to derive the SIL from a safety point of view.
However, the use of risk matrices in IT security is so widely used in TRA that it should
be kept, but it should be properly used with the definition of SL in IEC 62443.
We start from the following assumptions (without further justification):
· There exists an agreed risk matrix, like figure 2 or 3
· We can derive SLs which are defined by the type of attacker and the measures de-
fined by IEC 62443 (like in the previous chapter)
For the sake of the example, we assume the same sample risk matrix as shown from fig-
ure 3 (but we do not use the criticalities). The precise form of the matrix is not important,
however there should be a clear procedure which would be followed based on the color
code of the results.
In a TRA, we would assess all possible threat scenarios and classify them according to
their risk. The following example shows the result for three scenarios X, Y and Z.
Assume  we  have  defined  the  SL  by  the  type  of  attacker,  say  initially  SL  is  equal  to
(3,3,3,1,3,3,1). Then, we would start the TRA as a check and should arrive at tolerable risks
for safety-related threats (usually green or yellow fields, e. g. scenario X or Y). If we arrive
at orange or even red classifications (like scenario Z), this means we either misjudged the
SL in the beginning or we may have scenarios that represent additional IT security related
risks which are not safety-related. For example this might be a loss of reputation after a data
breach. This would mean that we have to define additional security requirements which are
not safety-related.
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8 Conclusion
This paper has reviewed the risk assessment approaches with respect to IT security and has
proposed a framework for risk assessment with particular focus on railway automation
applications. The concept aims at the separation of safety and security aspects, as far as
possible. This is achieved by integrating safety-related security requirements into the safety
process and the safety case.
It has been explained that this approach matches well with the planned ISA99/IEC62443
series of standards, but that some aspects such as SL allocation need to be adapted. If this
adaptation were successful, then railway automation could re-use the ISA99/IEC62443
series, in particular their standardized IT security requirements, and would not have to cre-
ate its own IT security standards. However, the work presented is still ongoing.
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